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Habitus encompasses the entire inner and outer attitude that 
people have acquired and consolidated socially. The social practice 
is organized by the habitus and is in comparison most reliably 
recognizable through it. If the apparent “hard facts” of the stratification 
characteristics or capital sorts can only inaccurately indicate the class 
affiliation of the individuals, it is obvious to start from the analysis 
of the habitus in research.
(Vester 2007, 26, trans. HWS)
The press has some justified grievances, but on the whole the 
Government has behaved well and has been surprisingly tolerant 
of minority opinions. The sinister fact about literary censorship in 
England is that it is largely voluntary. Unpopular ideas can be silenced, 
and inconvenient facts kept dark, without the need for any official ban. 
Anyone who has lived long in a foreign country will know of instances 
of sensational items of news—things which on their own merits would 
get the big headlines—being kept right out of the British press, not 
because the Government intervened but because of a general tacit 
agreement that “it wouldn’t do” to mention that particular fact. So far 
as the daily newspapers go, this is easy to understand. The British press 
is extremely centralised, and most of it is owned by wealthy men who 
have every motive to be dishonest on certain important topics. But the 
same kind of veiled censorship also operates in books and periodicals, 
as well as in plays, films and radio. At any given moment there is an 
orthodoxy, a body of ideas which it is assumed that all right-thinking 
people will accept without question. It is not exactly forbidden to say 
this, that or the other, but it is “not done” to say it, just as in mid-
Victorian times it was “not done” to mention trousers in the presence of 
a lady. Anyone who challenges the prevailing orthodoxy finds himself 
silenced with surprising effectiveness. A genuinely unfashionable 
opinion is almost never given a fair hearing, either in the popular press 
or in the highbrow periodicals.
(Orwell 2002[1945], 889 f.)
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Preface
The international reception of Bourdieu’s theory of habitus has reached a level 
that suggests that everything essential has been said. When reading the ever-grow-
ing body of secondary literature, one frequently experiences déjà-vu effects, lead-
ing to the impression that we are dealing with a passe-partout concept that, with 
only minimal variations and nuances, appears again and again as old wine in new 
bottles. Bourdieu himself generally limited this activity. For his journal Actes de 
la Recherche en Sciences Sociales, he imposed the unwritten law that the theoret-
ical concepts he had developed, above all “habitus,” should be used only when 
unavoidable. He commented this with a dry sense of humor: “Stop quoting me: do 
your own research!”
This is exactly what Heinrich Wilhelm Schäfer and his team demonstrate in 
a exemplary and refreshing way in the second volume of HabitusAnalysis. This is 
not yet another exegesis of Bourdieu’s work, not about the question for the “cor-
rect” or “legitimate” interpretation of this concept, not about claims to demon-
strate one’s own congenial interpretation. Rather, this is about dealing with a 
comprehensive and complex theoretical work in a way that is relaxed in regard to 
questions of conceptual orthodoxy. After all, “habitus” is not a concept that can be 
exactly dated in the history of Bourdieu’s work, neither in terms of its introduction 
nor of its conceptual use. In contrast, it is a research program that has successively 
developed since the early 1960s during studies about seemingly disparate socio-
logical topics and questions: From the ethos of brotherhood among the Kabyle 
people, over the societal use of photography and the visitation of museums, to the 
reproduction of social inequality. “Habitus” has no clear hour of birth, but rather 
an open end. It is not to be confused with Bourdieu’s work, which concluded with 
his death, it rather refers to the open construction site of socio-theoretical reflec-
tion that was initiated by him, inviting us to do further work using this theoreti-
cal paradigm and the respective tools of research methodology. The present case 
of Schäfer’s book clearly demonstrates how fruitful it can be to accept this invi-
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tation and grant oneself some freedom for the unorthodox use of this theoretical 
approach.
It may come as a surprise that a sociologist of religion, of all people, is follow-
ing such an innovative path of theoretical work regarding the concept of habitus. 
However, considering how much this concept owes to Bourdieu’s studies in so-
ciology of religion following Max Weber, one notices some common perspectives 
and interests. It was during his course on Max Weber at the University of Lille, 
which Raymond Aron imposed on him, that Bourdieu developed a growing en-
thusiasm for Weber’s reflections about goods of salvation, their monopolization, 
class-specific salvation demands or the religious virtuosity of elites. In this course, 
he not only developed his concept of the religious field and capital, but he also dis-
covered Weber’s use of the concept of habitus, which remains greatly ignored to 
this day, most likely due to the fact that it is missing from the index of Economy 
and Society. Bourdieu also treated the work of this great predecessor and progres-
sive thinker with a great deal of autonomy, which was typical of his undisciplined 
thinking and research as a sociological autodidact. He did not dwell on questions 
of meticulous exegesis, but continued to work with Weber’s stimulating analyses 
in his own way. At this time, he had already gained extensive experience in empir-
ical research and he had also implemented Weber’s theory on the relation between 
religious dispositions and economic habitus in his own way for his field research 
in Algeria.
In Schäfer’s conceptual work in this theoretical tradition, one also constantly 
notices that we are not dealing with a typical Homo Academicus who, sitting in 
his study, imposes his theoretical sense on the practical sense of societal actors 
in a top-down manner. In contrast, he can rely on a rich empirical perspective and 
its theoretical processing that feeds his large-scale study on habitus and the social 
conditions of its operation.
As a reminder: HabitusAnalysis 1 was about the detailed analysis of Bourdieu’s 
sociological handling of the meaning of practices, goods, signs, language, and so 
on, on the basis of almost all scientific publications by Bourdieu. In this context, 
Bourdieu’s contributions that were oriented explicitly toward social theory, as well 
as the empirical studies since the earliest autodidactic sociological attempts to 
walk in Kabylia, were subjected to a critical-reflexive reconstruction. This twofold 
approach is convincing simply because all of Bourdieu’s theoretical concepts were 
developed during diverse field studies and elaborate empirical studies in the sense 
of a grounded theory avant la lettre.
In this second volume of HabitusAnalysis, Bourdieu’s diverse theoretical 
considerations are subject of a careful re-lecture in order to arrive at a disposi-
tion-based theory of habitus, which serves Schäfer as the theoretical and meth-
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odological basis for a theory of identity as a network of disposition. In doing so, 
the author aims at reconstructing and making comprehensible the complex in-
terdependencies between mental and ethical orientations, societal structures and 
processes, as well as between social divisions and subdivisions—classes and classi-
fications. Dispositions are always interpreted as dependent on the position, as lo-
cated in the social space.
The present book aims explicitly at the construction of a theoretical frame-
work for the sociological analysis of religious praxis, yet it does not focus its theo-
retical argumentation on religion alone. Rather, it is about understanding religious 
praxis in a manner quite similar to how Bourdieu did, namely as just one of many 
diverse forms of human praxis, allowing for its own peculiarities, but also analyz-
ing it in terms of its functional and structural similarities to other forms of societal 
praxis. In this way, the sociological analysis of religion based on diverse empirical 
experiences that is presented here takes on the character of an exemplary contri-
bution to general sociology. By systematically linking complex theoretical con-
siderations with illustrative empirical descriptions, the theoretical work on the 
habitus concept, on the practical logic of action, and its socio-structural condi-
tions based on Bourdieu and going beyond, gains a new level of consistency in 
terms of operationalization and concretization and makes a refreshingly innova-
tive contribution to “research with Bourdieu.”
Franz Schultheis
Preliminary remarks
I met Francisco Quiacaín again on a cool morning by the shores of the lake. The 
smell of the early fires from the villager’s kitchens mingling with the fog, the first 
rays of sunshine coming through. Seven years had passed since our fieldwork in 
1985 and 1986. Now, the war was over. Two mildly democratic elections had been 
held. For the villagers, things had changed a lot since there was no longer a mili-
tary garrison nearby and they were able to rebuild their rural economy with some 
perspective of future improvement. Francisco had been one of our closest cooper-
ators—“informants” as older anthropology would have—in the village during the 
war. At that time, he had been clearly aware of the constant threat that the mili-
tary represented for the village. One of his own relatives had been kidnapped from 
his shack by soldiers at dawn and massacred in the outskirts of the village. How-
ever, Francisco also had been aware of God’s promise. He, and the whole congre-
gation of the Assemblies of God he was part of, firmly believed that the war was a 
clear sign of the end-times and that they, the faithful and true believers, were go-
ing to be raptured into heaven when Christ came back on the clouds of heaven, 
which they believed would happen very soon. Francisco was extremely convinced 
that event was drawing very near and he encouraged his fellow believers to pre-
pare for the coming of the Lord. Preparation meant strictly abastaining from en-
gaging in any “worldly” activity, such as cooperatives, social service, farmhand 
unions, and even more so the ranks of the guerrilla. Instead, getting ready to wel-
come the Lord meant withdrawing from the “world” and emersing oneself in the 
congregation, visiting the services frequently, praying, and always being ready to 
help any other believer in times of need. It was not possible to prevent the world 
outside from getting worse each day. Yet, while waiting for Christ to come, the 
scarce resources had to be shared among the sisters and brothers in faith. Never-
theless, instead of the return of Christ, elections took place and a peace accord was 
signed. Sometime later, after the outside pressure on the believers had lessened, a 
conflict over authority with the mestizo pastor of the congregation broke out and 
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part of the congregation left and joined what they called an “indigenous Pentecos-
tal” church made up of only autochthon villagers. Francisco became deacon and 
was able to boost his (very) small business to a certain extent. When I met him, 
he was quite well-off and had built a little house in a small settlement on the out-
skirts of the village. Still serving as deacon, he was also active in the neighborhood 
committee’s mobilization to demand a clean water supply and electricity—and in 
the elections, he had voted for the left-most alternative. Given his fierce preach-
ing of the immediate return of Christ, his rise to a high religious position was 
nothing to be amazed by. His commitment in the neighborhood committee, to-
gether with unbelievers, however, took me by surprise. Of course, I reminded him 
of the key premise of his Christian faith: the deep conviction that the coming of 
Christ was immediate, and that the consequence was to withdraw from any so-
cial activity whatsoever. He was still as theologically serious as ever, and argued in 
great detail: There is no doubt that the Lord is going to come back; but one does 
not know if this is going to take place next week, next year, or in, let’s say, twenty 
years. Therefore, a Christian must be disciplined and obedient to the precepts of 
the Lord, refrain from sinful behavior such as drinking, smoking, and womaniz-
ing, and promote a decent life for everybody, Christian or not. In any case, this is 
not a matter of choice, since the Lord will come back, and humans will be held re-
sponsible for their actions.
The delay of the Second Coming, among other things, made this book pos-
sible, as it was a task that certainly took its time. In the preface of volume 1, we 
told the entire story of our initial field research in Guatemala during the 1980s; of 
the proceeding years in Latin America; the dissertations based on HabitusAnal-
ysis that have been and are being written at Bielefeld University since 2006; and 
my own writing business. We also referred to the scientific context of friendly 
and helpful colleagues. It need not to be repeated here. In the meantime, among 
the team at our Center for the Interdisciplinary Research on Religion and Soci-
ety (CIRRuS), some new dissertations, books, and papers have been published 
and some others are under way.1 In the context of the intense exchange within our 
team, this all contributed to the present book.
1 Dissertations: Cecilia Delgado on religion, politics, and violence in Morelos, Mexico; 
Jacobo Tancara on the construction of subjectivity in urban marginal literature and 
Theology of Liberation; Rory Tews in economics on social entrepreneurs. Ongoing 
projects: on religious peacebuilders in Guatemala (Tamara Candela); Central Ameri-
can migrants in Los Angeles (Clara Buitrago); religious individuation in the megacity 
of Ciudad de México (Adrián Tovar); urban space and religious strategies in Mana-
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Finally, I would like to express my gratitude to the following institutions and 
people for their support. The German Research Foundation stayed true to the 
project and facilitated a one-year research leave in 2016. The Stockmeier Foun-
dation facilitated additional funding. The presidency of Bielefeld University sup-
ported the project in many ways. The Stockmeier foundation helped to fill the 
financial gaps that occur every now and then. Furthermore, the Springer publish-
ing house stayed true to our project. Megan Hanson did a great job on English 
copy editing. She made the text readable. At the end of this preface, I would like to 
express very special thanks to Sebastian Schlerka, who performed wonderfully as 
a critical reader, the author of most of the summaries, and a very realible manager 
of the technical work on this book. Another very special thank you goes to Leif 
Seibert who has not only been deeply involved with this project over the course 
of many years; he has also nurtured it in many ways with his profound and ample 
knowledge, from philosophy and logics, via religious studies, through to sociolog-
ical theory and methodoly. Taking into account the scientific context mentioned 
on the last pages, the good parts of this book are largely due to these people and 
institutions; the author holds himself responsible for any flaws.
One thing remains the same as it has been in the work on volume 1, and will 
remain unchanged with regard to volume 3. The work on this project resembles 
the strong and slow boring of hard boards…with passion and perspective, as Max 
Weber once said about politics.
gua, Nicaragua (Alvaro Espinoza); perception of muslim migrants by the German 
parliament (Sebastian Schlerka). Publications: Schäfer 2015a; 2016a; Schäfer et al. 
2015a; 2015b; 2018; Schäfer, Reu, and Tovar 2017; Schäfer, Seibert, and Tovar 2019; 
Seibert 2018; Schlerka 2017; 2018.
Conference papers are not listed here.
Introduction
Over the course of the ten years between our first cooperation during the war 
and our second meeting in the mid-1990s, Francisco Quiacaín’s dispositions 
of how he saw the world had changed. To be more precise: his habitus showed 
continuities, but also new elements. Furthermore, the central focus of his convic-
tions had definitely shifted. Habitūs change according to the challenges a person 
or a group faces; but they also remain the same in many regards. These pro-
cesses are best understood by the habitus modeled as a network of dispositions. 
From this perspective, the relations between dispositions and social interactions, 
events, and structural conditions appear to the sociological eye as myriads of 
relations, which combine in varying ways to become notable social effects. Em-
bodied conditions, such as dispositions of perception, judgment, and action 
orientation as well as objectified conditions, such as common sense, law, material 
structures, conditions of production and distribution of goods, can be under-
stood sociologically as caught up in a constant dynamic of interrelation. Hence, 
things vary, yet they do not vary in a completely senseless or chaotic way. Maybe 
one can understand continuities and changes in society and human action a bit 
like theme and improvisation in jazz. These interrelations between embodied dis-
positions and objectified conditions have to be described in a sociological theory 
before we can develop models that are particularly apt to capture such social in-
terplay.
After having discussed the epistemological conditions of our proposal in vol-
ume 1, we will approach the task of designing a sociological framework in the 
present book. We will continue to follow Bourdieu, but we will not replicate his 
theory one-to-one. In any case, an attempt to do so would assume that there 
is an orthodox interpretation of Bourdieu’s work and engage in struggles over 
the hegemony in the field of Bourdieu specialists. We do not claim orthodoxy. 
Therefore, we will pay tribute to scholars specialized in Bourdieu’s work, but we 
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generally will not engage in polemics about the “one true” interpretation.2 We 
will focus on our interpretation of Bourdieu’s work and the new elements we add 
to it. Our goal is a theory and a method that help in understanding the varying 
linkages between convictions of people and the conditions of their social environ-
ment. Therefore, we will not excoriate Bourdieu’s sociology; that is, we will not 
pull the cheap ploy of “Mister X now shows the ‘sociologist of the century’ to be 
all wrong.” Nor will we follow every one of Bourdieu’s proposals; that is, we will 
maintain, for instance, a critical stance towards the “field of power.” We will also 
make a couple of proposals, which we have gratefully established upon the foun-
dation of Bourdieu’s work, but which go a step further. Finally, we do not show off 
the prophetic habitus of scholars who identify foes left and right in order to create 
from the alchemy of the argumentum ad temperantiam a miraculously true mid-
dle position for themselves. However, this does not mean that we do not engage 
in controversies when necessary. One of these few issues that we argue about is 
the allegation by some scholars that Bourdieu was a “determinist”—whatever they 
mean by that.
Notwithstanding, sociology does not take place in a void. Rather, the field of 
sociology is a highly conflictive area. Therefore, any publication inevitably and 
objectively conveys its positioning in distinction from or even in contradiction 
to other positions. It is quite probable that readers will see tension between our 
approach and some sociological currents that are en vogue today: especially in-
dividualist and teleological theories of (rational) action, subjectivist theories of 
intersubjective world-making, and, finally, post-modernist neo-idealism in its 
different forms—particularly those theories that neglect or disregard material 
production and social structures when dealing with discourse and practices. We 
are rather somewhat conservative and recall that sociology is about “concern-
ing itself with the interpretive understanding of social action and thereby with 
a causal explanation of its course and consequences” (Weber 1978, 4). From a 
praxeological point of view, this also means reconstructing the meaning that the 
actors under inquiry themselves ascribe to their experiences; but it also necessar-
ily means reconstructing the economic, political and military facts (among others) 
that condition these experiences. In other words, and in spite of our particular in-
2 For instance, we do not take sides in the so-called homines in extremis-debate or sim-
ilar issues (Wacquant 2014a; 2014b; Atkinson 2015; G 2015; Lahire 2003; 2011). At 
most, we discuss them briefly with a side note and rather develop our own position 
that will be granted its place in relation to this debate if someone becomes interested 
in this relation. Secondary literature and alternative approaches will of course be dis-
cussed throughout the entire book.
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terest in meaning, we are not afforded the divine right to float in the thin air of 
semiology and “textism”3—a condition that however by no means implies falling 
prey to “materialism.”
This takes us to the issue of religion. The method of the praxeological square 
and the entire program of HabitusAnalysis have been developed primarily during 
the sociological study of religious praxis. Religious praxis is also a main reference 
point in the present book. Nevertheless, the program of HabitusAnalysis and its 
methods are broadly sociological and extend far beyond the sociology of religion.4 
Therefore, neither in volume 1 nor in this book we focus specifically on religion. 
We will devote a great deal of attention to meaning, its production, and its effects 
in society. Given the present state of the art in sociology of religion, the combina-
tion of meaning and religion seems to tempt sociologists to take the easy path of 
neo-idealism and stick only to language or symbolic exchange. Hence, in the fol-
lowing lines we will locate our approach roughly within the frame of some present 
developments and debates.
We will refer to the results of two studies. A recent review is interested in 
Bringing back the social into the sociology of religion and critically examines cur-
rent debates. Furthermore, an empirical survey of publications by US-American 
sociologists of religion over the last 40 years focuses especially on the construc-
tion of causality and on religious bias.5 Both studies highlight two observations. 
The first is a return of religious sociology of religion. An increasing number of ac-
ademics apparently insist that scholars of religion have to be engaged in religious 
praxis themselves and criticize a former “secularist” disdain among sociologists of 
religion. We understand the concern that “enlightened” sociologists could possi-
bly be unwilling to see anything other than priestly fraud—as Bourdieu tends to 
do—as well as the concern that sociologists of religion are ill-informed about re-
ligious praxis. We also share the admiration for the detailed knowledge shown 
by phenomenologists. However, none of this provides sufficient reason to regress 
to Rudolf Otto (1959). Particularly because I am not only a sociologist, but also 
theologian, I strongly opt for Max Weber’s position. His interest in religion is not 
focused on the “essence of religion” (Weber 1978, 399), but on religious social 
3 We talk about a “semiological vision of the world (…) which constitutes social reality 
as text” (Bourdieu 2004b; see also 1990e, G: 1998k).
4 See in the Preface, note 1. For our concept of religion, see, for instance, the following 
publications: Schäfer 2016a; 2016b; 2014a; Schäfer et al. 2015a.
5 Altglas and Wood 2018b. See especially the following contributions to this volume: 
Altglas and Wood 2018a; Malogne-Fer 2018; Doak 2018; Monnot 2018; Fer 2018. The 
results of the empirical study are published in Smilde and May 2010; 2015.
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praxis; and generally social science should avoid value judgment (Weber 1949, 
50 ff.). Hence, an attitude of methodological agnosticism is a standard that was 
established many years ago. It prevents both a bias in favor and a bias to the det-
riment of religion. From this point of view, postulating that social science must 
account for transcendent beings6 implies the confusion of sociology with theol-
ogy. They transpose the illusio of the religious field to the field of social science 
(Altglas and Wood 2018a, 13). More precisely, the attempt at a religious sociol-
ogy rather jeopardizes responsible sociological epistemology. The latter respects 
the limits of scientific knowledge and therefore concentrates on the faith of the 
observed actors7 rather than on metaphysical beliefs of the researcher. Believers’ 
faith in a transcendent being can be understood well enough if the sociologist ac-
cepts and systematically takes into account that believers can act as if their faith 
was able to move mountains (Mt. 21: 21) (Schäfer 2014a, 2). This said, religious 
language and dispositions should be understood as having a specific structure. 
The actors’ relation to transcendence plays a specific role that has to be accounted 
for by research methodology (see vol. 3). Nevertheless, sociology of religion will 
have to address not only the faith, but also the mountains that are to be moved.
This brings us to the other problem stated with regard to the sociological 
production of religion. It is the fact that religion is merely seen as ideas and com-
munication, or finally, as text. Smilde and May take the sociology of the so-called 
“strong program” (Jeffrey Alexander) as their prototype for this kind of approach. 
One also could refer to certain currents of European sociology based on phe-
nomenology, focused on discourse, and ignoring social structures, especially 
socio-economic production and reproduction. In other words, we face a kind of 
textism. Interestingly, Smilde and May prove a correlation between this sociologi-
cal textism and a positive bias towards religion. This may be due to the fact that the 
exclusive focus on religious discourse simply fails to approach the social condi-
tions and the social effects of religious praxis.8 (At least, there is no systematic way 
to tackle these conditions.) In a way, this is similar to a person that deliberately 
blinds one of their eyes in order to live without depth perception. Smilde and May 
6 See, for instance, Archer 2004; Doak 2018.
7 Even hermeneutic theology respects that we cannot claim to see God as we “see a 
cow” (Meister Eckart) but that the object of theological knowledge is faith. Among 
others, see Ebeling 1979; Schäfer 2004a.
8 A similar opposition haunts the sociology of religion in Germany with its sharp sep-
aration (not distinction) between “qualitative” and “quantitative” approaches and a 
grim debate about the possibility of a mutual benefit. Kelle (2008, 13 ff., 25 ff.) at-
tempts to overcome the blockade.
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put the problem in yet another perspective. They were indeed able to categorize 
the literature produced in the USA according to a criterion fostered by Alexan-
der’s approach: whether culture/religion or social structure are the independent 
or the dependent variable. The fact that this distinction proves to be significant 
in a study on scholarly publications says a lot about the either-or mentality that 
seems to pervade the social science production on religion. From a praxeological 
point of view, however, the epistemological question is misguided altogether. It is 
not about an either-or relation between beliefs and material structures (see vol-
ume 1), but about praxis that always unfolds under the influence of both mental 
and material conditions.
The praxeological approach to religion as well as to wider social praxis stands 
for the latter point of view.9 If one put it in terms of causality, one could state 
that causal effects are exerted from both sides, so to say, but with continuously 
changing relevance of any of the different influential factors. There are situations 
in which convictions play the prominent role in regulating practices; and there 
are other situations in which changes in material social structures exert stron-
ger effects. Moreover, both causal factors are connected by the experience of social 
actors that is processed by the dispositions of the habitus and thus again has struc-
turing effects on the social conditions. Praxeological sociology of religion is able 
to give a systematic account of various directions of causality since it triangu-
lates different analytical models and provides the theoretical frame to do so; and 
praxeological sociology of religion strongly focuses on how actors process their 
experiences. In other words, praxeology leaves reductionism behind, whether it 
be materialist or neo-idealist (textist).
The present book is dedicated to the construction of a theoretical frame for a 
sociological approach to religious praxis without the focus of theoretical reason-
ing on religion itself. This is because we understand religious praxis to be just one 
of many forms of human praxis with its own specificities, but also with its relations 
to other kinds of praxis. We understand religion to be a human activity that peo-
ple are caught in with their body, soul, and mind, and that people either share or 
argue over with their neighbors. What people believe is just one side of the coin, 
9 There is an increasing number of scholars who approach religion from a praxeolog-
ical, or at least a similar standpoint. One of the pioneers deserves to be mentioned 
first: Otto Maduro (2005). Beyond the authors mentioned in volume 1 (353 ff.), we 
would like to list here some the authors in this line of research in alphabetical or-
der. The scholars that contributed to Altglas and Wood 2018b; Egger et al. 2000; Fer 
2010; Martikainen and Gauthier 2013; McCloud 2007; Rey 1999; 2007; Suárez 2015; 
Vásquez 2011 (esp. 231 ff.).
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the other side of which is the power and the capability to act that these people 
(and their institutions) have in relation to others and to the social opportunities 
and constraints they are situated in. Religion is mental and material praxis that 
operates through signs, practices, and things. In order to grasp religion as social 
praxis it is therefore reasonable to provide a theoretical and methodological frame 
that is valid for social praxis in general—which is certainly nothing specific only 
to praxeological sociology since most other theories, such as systems theory or ra-
tional choice, operate the same way. We will maintain a connection to religious 
praxis through many of the examples that illustrate theoretical considerations and 
through the vignettes that precede each chapter. However, more than that, the en-
tire theoretical approach to praxis can be read as an approach to religious praxis. 
The elaborations on habitus of course work for the religious habitus as well, and 
so do the considerations regarding fields and the social space for the religious field 
and for the positions of religious actors in the social space.10
According to our understanding of religion,11 the experiences of religious ac-
tors are central since they relate the processes of the material world and cognitive 
operations with one another. In short, religious interpretation counters experi-
ences of contingency. Such experiences range from the reflection upon one’s own 
finitude and mortality to concrete situations of social crises and threats, such as 
economic scarcity, military repression, and ecological catastrophes. The process 
of interpretation involves—to a large extent spontaneous and irreflexive—acts of 
perception and judgment as well as action orientation and action. Thus, religious 
interpretation is not simply a cognitive operation, but part of transforming so-
cial structures and essential for how actors are formed by their experiences of 
the social structure. The operational mode of this process is similar in religious 
and non-religious praxis. Yet, the specific difference resides in the religious actors’ 
reference to transcendence. They interpret experience by means of a “promise 
10 The suitability of Bourdieu’s theoretical categories for an approach to is partly due to 
the fact that he developed and sharpened some of them—especially fields and hab-
itus—in his early articles of 1971 on religion (Bourdieu 1987c, G: 2000c; 1991b, G: 
2000b; see also Bourdieu 2000d; Rey 2007). Furthermore, his early studies on the 
Kabyle and the development of the concepts of habitus and symbolic violence ad-
dressed highly ritualized cultural praxis, in many ways similar to religion. However, 
his specific view on religion is flawed by the allegation that religious praxis simply is 
legitimatory of interests and especially of domination (Crossley 2001; Parker 1996; 
Urban 2003; also vol. 1, 353 ff.). In consequence, Bourdieu’s most relevant contribu-
tion to the study of religion is his general theory (Verter 2003, 150, 152; Rey 2007).
11 For our concept of religion, see Schäfer 2004a; 2009; 2014a; 2016b. The following con-
siderations see with more detail in Schäfer et al. 2015a.
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of salvation” (Riesebrodt 2010). Salvation can range from a ritual statement of 
authority, a fortuneteller’s prognosis, or a miraculous healing to the expectance 
of a “new heaven and a new earth.” The actors’ reference to such an imagined tran-
scendent causality can have different social effects, from legitimizing domination 
and integrating society through compensation to revolution.
The crucial point of difference to utopian aims of modern social movements 
in general is the reference to a transcendent entity, an “otherworldly” (Weber) re-
ality. Religious actors derive their authority and orientation from the reference 
to a transcendent entity that they claim exists and to which they ascribe certain 
properties. Thus, religious actors connect the transcendent sphere to some idea of 
divine beings or “superhuman powers,” as Riesebrodt (2010, 71 ff.) puts it; in other 
words, to semantic content. They relate “earthly” experiences by causal nexūs to 
transcendent entities; and they hold up the distinction between experiences and 
their transcendent causes. The transcendent is believed to exist as an absolute be-
ing and, just as such, it becomes concrete and practical; it becomes an operator of 
practical sense and of practical logic. Thus, the relation between earthly experi-
ences and otherworldly interpretations creates religious identities, strategies and, 
finally, praxis very much on its own. Hence, the specificity of religious praxis is not 
to strictly separate religious from non-religious spheres, or religious symbols from 
material processes. Its specificity resides in the interpretation of non-religious and 
material processes in a religious way, emphasizing the distinction between im-
manent and transcendent powers. In consequence, while the formal process of 
interpreting experience and creating identities and strategies in religion is entirely 
the same as in any other form of social praxis, in the face of one and the same 
social conditions and situations religious interpretation and experience display 
characteristically different capacities than non-religious interpretation. Thus, re-
ligious identities and strategies can provide an alternative and sometimes more 
effective way of coming to terms with challenges.
Since these religious processes of interaction as well as identity and strategy 
formation take place in the context of objectified and institutionalized social 
relations, these relations have to be accounted for from a theoretical and meth-
odological perspective. The embodied operations and interactions must be 
understood within the framework of objectified social production and reproduc-
tion in the diverse spheres of society. In the sociological tradition, there are mainly 
two ways to address these social structures: functional and stratificatory differ-
entiation. In praxeology, the former is theorized by the concept of field, further 
developing upon Weber’s concepts of social spheres or life orders (Weber 1946a, 
passim and p. 323). In consequence, the relations among religious experts as well 
as the relation between experts and laity can be theoretically modeled as religious 
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field. The triangulation with the embodied conditions of the actors—habitus and 
practical sense—allows for the understanding of the influence of religious posi-
tions regarding religious convictions and vice versa. Stratificatory differentiation 
is theorized by the concept of the social space that allows one to locate actors in 
relation to other actors according to their overall capital accumulation. With re-
gard to religious actors and their convictions, the model is useful to locate the 
actors within their objective social relations, that is, to focus on the relations be-
tween “status, class, and religion” and thus be able to reconstruct, for instance, 
“The religious propensities of peasantry, nobility and bourgeoisie.”12 In other 
words, the triangulation between social space and religious habitūs facilitates the 
understanding of the interplay between religious convictions and the overall op-
portunities and constraints the religious actors face.
In order to describe these practical relations well in their actor-specific and 
institutional dimensions, it is recommendable to apply the entire range of prax-
eological theorems, methods, and possibilities of triangulation that we are trying 
to provide with HabitusAnalysis. Since the formal processes are the same with re-
gard to non-religious and religious praxis, the latter can be described by means of 
its relations to other forms of praxis and, at the same time, its specificities will be-
come more visible. This approach requires epistemological reflections, which we 
have contributed in volume 1. Therefore, we will only share some brief thoughts 
on hermeneutics at this point.
With regard to the praxeological program, there is a hermeneutical issue to 
consider. It is about the reception of Bourdieu’s theory in the North Atlantic 
region. The problem becomes particularly visible from a Latin American perspec-
tive, or from the way in which Latin American sociologists work with Bourdieu’s 
theory.13 In Latin America, the theorems that focus on social structure (fields and 
social space) are more important for understanding symbolic practices than is the 
case in the North Atlantic. Many Latin American colleagues say that this has to do 
not least with their own precarious conditions that constantly remind them of the 
significance of objectified social conditions. Furthermore, there is another con-
text of production and reception that sheds some light on the fate of Bourdieu’s 
theory in sociological debate. Bourdieu developed the cornerstones of his theory 
in the sixties and early seventies against the background of highly objectivistic 
12 See Weber 1978, 468 ff., as well as “The religion of non-privileged strata” (481 ff.), and 
“Intellectualism, intellectuals, and salvation religion” (500 ff.).
13 Castro and Suárez 2018; Maduro 2005 [first published 1979]; García and Gutiérrez 
2000. See also Suárez 2006; 2009; Martínez 2007; Moraña 2014. And with Habitus-
Analysis Delgado Molina 2018.
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neo-Marxist and functionalist sociologies. In sharp distinction to the hegemonic 
currents of that time, he developed a theory that strongly focused on the embod-
ied conditions of actors, habitus, practical logic, symbolic violence, culture, and 
so forth, as early as in Outline of a Theory of Practice, first published in French in 
1972. Being published roughly around the same time as post-modernism started 
to gain momentum, there were two widespread types of reductionist reception. 
Some readers rejected Bourdieu’s approach entirely (as determinist, making lan-
guage and symbol a servant of the social structures, and similar accusations), 
while others overlook the socio-structural aspect and treat it as a theory of mere 
communication and symbolic relations. The “classifications” are deprived of the 
“classes,” so to say, while for Bourdieu either one can only be understood in its re-
ciprocal relation to the other (Bourdieu 2010, 468, G: 1982a, 727). In the latter 
way of reading his work, Bourdieu can be treated as a culturalist author, leav-
ing aside his emphasis on the relation between embodied dispositions, symbolic 
and other practices, and objectified social conditions. If Bourdieu is currently the 
most cited and read sociologist worldwide, some of this success is probably due 
to a culturally reductionist reception of his work. This observation prompts a her-
meneutical question. Over the course of the last thirty years or so, the hegemony 
of Marxist and functionalist objectivism has given way to subjectivist, post-mod-
ernist, communicational, and symbol-oriented interpretations of the sociological 
task, occupying a much stronger position in the field of sociology today than when 
Outline was first published. This change of context suggests a contemporary relec-
ture of Bourdieu’s oeuvre. It should be read in contrast to a completely different 
background than the one in distinction to which it was produced. In other words, 
while “classifications” had to be accentuated over “classes” in the 1960s and 70s, 
today it is the other way around: in contrast to an overly prolific interest in clas-
sifications, the classes and their reciprocal relations with the human mind and 
practices deserve attention again. For our interest in meaning, this hermeneutic 
condition implies the challenge of not getting stuck in the analysis of language use 
and symbolic practices alone, but rather paying special attention to the objectified 
conditions of language use, be these objectified as material structures, social in-
stitutions, and so forth, or embodied as dispositional structures. Throughout this 
book, the reader will note that embodied dispositions and objectified social con-
ditions will be continuously related to each other by reference to experience and 
practices of actors.
In our opinion, the fact that Bourdieu’s praxeology is so widely debated, es-
tablished, and applied today is due to a paradox. On the one hand, Bourdieu 
emphasizes that his theory offers an open toolbox, and many scholars use his the-
ory in this way. Concepts like habitus, cultural capital, field, and others are widely 
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used as single or combined tools in specific research designs. On the other hand, 
Bourdieu’s type of praxeology has developed over the course of his work (and 
thanks to many scholars that follow in his footsteps) into a veritable grand theory 
that is capable of functioning as a framework of reference for many different kinds 
of theoretical and methodological approaches.
Bourdieu’s talk of a toolbox has certain plausibility in view of his development 
of theory alongside empirical inquiries. It may even sound chic. Yet, it quickly 
loses its logic if a researcher intends to use just one single tool. I would even go so 
far as to say that the metaphor of the toolbox conveys (intended or unintended) 
misrecognition of the theory. It invites scholars to use one tool or another, and 
over the course of their work with it, the very dynamic of the overarching theory 
tends to increasingly draw the scholar into its logics. If you want to study, for ex-
ample, the mechanisms of symbolic violence between two groups of people, it will 
not be enough to simply employ the concept of symbolic violence. The researcher’s 
focus will additionally require clear concepts of misrecognition (building upon a 
certain idea of perception and judgment), which requires the modeling of the so-
cial differences between the groups at hand, a clear concept of what is meant by 
“symbolic” (which is quite different from the common sense concept), an idea 
about how social structure, experiences, and judgment are related, and about the 
meaning and function of capital, to name a few. Instead of just one tool, research-
ers need a set of matching tools. I think that this is due to the fact that Bourdieu’s 
social theory indeed is not just a toolbox, but something like a grand theory. As 
such, it serves to frame different approaches to single areas of scholarly interest 
and to employ diverse analytical methods. It is possible that this capacity is one of 
the reasons for the wide reception of praxeology. A quick glance at the so-called 
“turns” might illustrate what I mean. Each “turn” indicates a specific research 
interest that can be connected to praxeological theory if desired. Many of the in-
terests of the linguistic (Rorty), symbolic (Geertz), and corporeal turn (Gugutzer) 
can be addressed by the concepts of habitus and practical logic. The performative 
(Turner), iconic (Boehm), and spatial (Soja) turn, as well as intersectional per-
spectives can be responded to by the concepts of practical logic, logic of praxis, 
and the concepts of fields and social space. The large theoretical field of logic of 
praxis and practical logic even invites the use of discourse-analytical methods; 
and the concept of habitus together with the construction of the social space can 
be integrated into advanced methods of geometric data analysis.14 Finally, the in-
14 In this sense, as a team we have been invited to outline perspectives of mutual enrich-
ment between HabitusAnalysis and geometric methods (Schäfer, Seibert, and Tovar 
2019) as well as discourse analysis (Schäfer et al. 2015a; 2015b).
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terests of feminist approaches have been addressed explicitly by Bourdieu himself 
(Bourdieu 2001a, G: 2005a). The relative openness of praxeology as an approach 
that oscillates between toolbox and grand theory allows for ample dialogue with 
all of these different approaches.
Nevertheless, as much as praxeology may be seen as a grand theory, it does not 
explain everything, nor does it aspire to do so. Certain aspects of private life may 
not be adequately accounted for, as Lahire (2011) points out. A torx screwdriver 
only fits torx screws. In consequence, one could interpret the toolbox metaphor as 
a euphemism that hides a grand theory. We understand it to be an understatement 
and a euphemism at the same time. It is an understatement since the entire con-
glomerate of Bourdieu’s theorems exhibits an astonishing coherence over many 
different empirical fields and theoretical topics. It is a euphemism in the sense that 
it indeed hides the fact that praxeological theory neither claims to be nor is a the-
ory with a universal capacity of sociological explanation. Since Bourdieu did not 
intend on constructing a perfectly conclusive and scholastic palace of theory, but 
rather advanced his work with empirical projects, his theory cannot be completely 
conclusive. Another reason that social theories often are not all too conclusive is 
social reality itself. Praxis proceeds quite logically, yet it is not completely logical. 
Bourdieu therefore calls “practical logic” an open, variable, and partly illogical 
logic. The concept of the field of power, for example, is one of the auxiliary con-
structs that are important for the overall approach, but that is difficult to integrate 
into a coherent theoretical logic. Furthermore, there are different concepts—such 
as field and market—that resemble and overlap more than one would consider 
useful for a scholastic theory. Furthermore, Bourdieu’s vocabulary develops quite 
freely with every new empirical project and is not governed by a strict termino-
logical regime, such as Luhmann’s, for instance. Finally, praxeology is neither a 
theory of everything nor does it attempt to construct a social ontology.
On these grounds, any attempt to present Bourdieu’s theory “as it really is” is 
doomed to fail. Neither do we aim at giving a systematic overview of it. There are 
so many compendia on Bourdieu’s theory that there is hardly a need for another 
one. Our approach to Bourdieu’s theory over three decades has always been mo-
tivated and informed by empirical research projects and their evaluations (see in 
the preface of this volume and of vol. 1); and finally, it focuses on the development 
of HabitusAnalysis as a theoretically established method of inquiry into the use of 
language and symbolic practices in the context of social conditions of existence. 
Therefore, ours is not only a perspective just as any other perspective in its own 
right; it has rather been developed as a praxeological method to address language 
and symbolic expression, which requires theoretical reflection and a serious the-
oretical framework. For this reason, this book will present some particularities, 
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such as the chapter on generative terms. We will give the usual overview at the end 
of this introduction.
As our main objective is to develop methods for the empirical research on 
habitūs—networks of dispositions, as we conceptualize them—we have to deal 
with the fact that practical logic necessarily is not completely logical in a scientific 
sense. Therefore, we have to come to terms with its fuzziness and develop a form 
of praxis analysis that produces results that are sufficiently logical as to identify 
structures, as well as sufficiently open as to avoid artificial conclusiveness. In the 
present book, we will prepare the theoretical groundwork for our construction of 
models (in volume 3) that help to grasp the basic dynamics of practical logic and 
particularly practical sense.
Regarding epistemology, we emphasized Cassirer’s relationist legacy and the 
pragmatist influences of Wittgenstein. Now, the main focus of Bourdieu (in our 
opinion) and of our reception of his theory are the relations between social struc-
tures (and respective data) and utterances and practices of actors. From this point 
of view, one could also establish a certain resemblance with logical positivism. 
However, one would certainly be aware of the fact that Bourdieu, in contrast to 
Carnap,15 is not interested in a constructional (sic!) system (Carnap 2003, 173 ff., 
Konstitutionssystem) of concepts or objects, and that the point of comparison is 
rather the fact that Carnap analyzes reality by means of relations. We will not elab-
orate on this point, but will make some remarks to this regard throughout this 
book.
Our main field of empirical research is religion. Nevertheless, the praxeologi-
cal approach we will outline in this book goes beyond religious praxis. Therefore, 
we have reduced the particular observations on religious praxis to a minimum.
Praxeology conveys normative conditions just as any other sociological ap-
proach does. Generally, normative presuppositions coin the perspectives on society 
to a certain extent. Weber’s thesis of a necessary freedom from value judgments 
in social science is an important aim for reflexive research processes and research 
design. Methodological self-awareness—as advocated by Bourdieu (Bourdieu, 
Chamboredon, and Passeron 1991b, G: 1991a), and an important reason to imple-
ment models as instruments of control—serves this purpose. Nevertheless, each 
scholar has their own personal background, including the decisions they have 
made, starting in their early scientific career, which play a role in how they work. 
For instance, Weber’s interest in social domination and power is a decision that, 
within its frame and due to its conscious employment, facilitates the control and 
prevention of corresponding value judgments in research. Nevertheless, it defines 
15 Carnap 2003. A strong statement in this direction in Seibert 2018, 142 ff.
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criteria of observation, which another scholar—let us say Durkheim—might not 
employ. Similarly, some scholars look through the lens of the rational individual, 
some through that of the construction of the world by intersubjective communi-
cation, some through that of social systems void of actors, and so forth. This kind 
of decision may be supported by the research realized within the frame of each 
of these approaches and thus may entail self-confirming dynamics. Nevertheless, 
the initial decision to take a certain path and not another is generally made due 
to the influence of the social position of the scholar and of key experiences be-
yond and prior to the scientific system as such. In Bourdieu, this might have been 
his experience with the deep-rooted social inequality during his childhood and 
youth in Béarn and the conditions of war he witnessed in Algeria. However, these 
issues cannot be addressed in this book.16 We will simply state that in Bourdieu’s 
theory—and in our reception of it—relations of power, domination, struggle, and 
social inequality are central and are a precondition of his sociological work.
Bourdieu’s focus on struggle, power, and social inequality is most likely the 
reason some critics call Bourdieu a Marxist. Some others in turn even doubt he 
has a handle on the concept of capitalism (Calhoun 1993, 68 f.). Although this 
may be the case, praxeological theory has the normative bias of seeing the world 
as a place of inequality and power struggles. This inclination is also easy to tell 
from Bourdieu’s political activities for social justice and against neoliberalism.17 
Inasmuch as his sociology serves to uncover well-hidden power relations and 
the oppression of human beings by other human beings, it is a sociology which, 
in the best tradition of European humanism, is not just an awareness campaign, 
but an “enlightenment campaign” (Aufklärungskampagne, Egger and Schultheis 
2014, 254).
Of course, there is a bias and some pitfalls that need to be controlled. But ev-
ery sociology has its biases and pitfalls—and approaches whose representatives 
claim not to have any normative precondition are even worse. For instance, which 
kind of hermeneutics do those who denounce Bourdieu for having a “hermeneu-
tics of suspicion” have themselves? A hermeneutics of naïveté? To simply register 
symbolic expression without putting it in its social context of use is not sociology 
and, moreover, an irresponsible attitude in times when troll armies manipulate in-
formation worldwide and governments as well as right wing activists jeopardize 
democratic politics by calculated fake news. Praxeology, in any case, focuses the 
social conditions and effects of symbolic expression; and it reveals its bias towards 
16 See Bourdieu 2004c, G: 2002; Schultheis 2007.
17 For example only a few sources: Bourdieu 1998l, G: 2004d; 1998m, G: 2004e; 1998n, 
G: 1998o; 1996c.
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an understanding of society as a network of conflictive relations and even renders 
this bias methodologically reflexive—enlightened, so to say.
In the present book we face the difficulty that the leading concepts of praxeol-
ogy explain one another. To do this condition justice, a written presentation 
cannot proceed in a linear mode, but must constantly make recursive references. 
The concepts are developed according to practical research and its requirements 
so that they hardly can be put into hierarchies (such as neo-Platonism would 
have it). One possible way to structure a book on praxeological theory would be 
to arrange important concepts in a “series” (Cassirer), going from objectified to 
embodied conditions. The result would be the following: Dispositions — habi-
tus — practical sense — practical logic — logic of praxis — fields — social space.18 We 
have designed the second part of the book according to this series in order to 
map praxeology. However, mapping is a problem if it establishes defined cate-
gories and thus draws borders along an open area that in fact has crisscrossing 
relations. In the second part, we will only be able to partially remedy the problem 
of categorization with the following measures: frequent cross references, resump-
tion of concepts in different contexts, and with a very special last chapter. In its 
first section we “look back” on the entire book from the perspective of objecti-
fied structures (fields and social space) and establish cross references from there. 
Readers who are more interested in fields and social space can thus discover from 
the perspective of these objectified structures views on the theories of the embod-
ied conditions of praxis and on the practical logic. This editorial measure might 
not be the philosopher’s stone, but it at least does some justice to the recursiveness 
of the theoretical concepts.
For the first part of the book, we have chosen an unusual approach to praxeo-
logical theory in order to reveal some of its internal dynamics that in many other 
explanations are hidden by the emblematic concepts, like habitus or field. We 
focus on generative terms of praxeology. That is, on concepts that traverse praxe-
ology as a whole and function as a kind of nervous system of the theory.
Thus, in the first part of the book, we will identify a couple of concepts—such 
as operator, perception, judgment, scheme, network and more—that are not con-
sidered emblematic concepts of praxeology, but that operate, so to say, under the 
18 Other concepts, such as embodied and objectified capital, illusio, game, sense of one’s 
place, strategy, speech, classification, classes, and so forth, can easily be arranged 
within this series of main theoretical reference points. Since the use of the concepts of 
practical sense, practical logic, and logic of praxis in Bourdieu is somewhat blurred, 
their position in the series is the result of our interpretation of Bourdieu’s sociology 
(Schäfer 2015a).
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surface of Bourdieu’s theoretical insignia (such as habitus, field, and social space) 
and that function as generative terms for praxeological theory. These concepts 
help to understand the practical operations implied by the emblematic concepts in 
more detail. In consequence, the generative terms are highly relevant for our goal 
of establishing (in vol. 3) a method for the empirical analysis of habitus in the 
context of fields and social space. With this goal in mind, we aim at establishing 
vocabulary that is as clear-cut as possible for empirical praxeological research.19 In 
consequence, we have to deal with two facts: First, Bourdieu even uses his central 
concepts in a somewhat opalescent way and constantly modifies them over time. 
Second, the habitus theory is pivotal for Bourdieu’s entire praxeology as well as for 
our methodology. Hence, we have to manage the task of methodologically distill-
ing viable concepts that, at the same time, narrow down the meaning of some key 
concepts and still stay true to the logic of praxeology. In other words, we have to 
name and describe those concepts that best serve to develop the projected meth-
odology of empirical praxeological research (vol. 3).
Generative terms represent deep operators—“underneath” the central theoret-
ical concepts. Often, they denote single processes (perception, judgment) that the 
major concepts refer to across-the-board. Or they indicate functional properties 
(fuzziness, network structure) that go unmentioned with the main concepts. Hab-
itus, for instance, is often used as a very wide and global concept, but in order to 
understand this concept adequately it is necessary to grasp the operating terms, 
such as embodiment, schemes, the dynamics of perception, judgment, and action 
orientation, dispositions, and so forth. The generative terms represent most of the 
internal rationality presupposed by Bourdieu’s major concepts and we consider 
them to be key in the development of a viable methodology for HabitusAnaly-
sis. They serve to specify single practical operations that are useful for deriving 
operational categories for the construction of models and other methodological 
procedures. A side effect, highly welcome from an epistemological perspective, is 
that generative terms help to prevent the reification of the main concepts.
Our examination of the generative terms in the first part of the book focuses 
on social actors. For one thing, as to our understanding the social actor is at the 
19 But we do not intend to develop a conceptual metaphysics of social life, as we already 
highlighted in HabitusAnalysis 1. The relations we establish here between generative 
terms and major theoretical concepts of Bourdieu’s theory are merely analytical and 
are exclusively for the purpose of clarifying our vocabulary for the construction of the 
method. Nevertheless, we are well aware that a rigorous analytical distinction might 
also entail the repression of a productive conceptual indeterminacy, which leaves a 
couple of theoretical distinctions intentionally unmarked.
38 Introduction
center of Bourdieu’s praxeology; for another, we are mainly interested in the con-
cept of habitus. Hence, we have chosen those generative terms that prove to be 
most relevant for the processes of the actors’ “internalization of externality and 
the externalization of internality” (Bourdieu). With respect to fields and so-
cial space, the central generative term capital is also addressed in the first part. 
A closer look to the first part reveals that the considerations contribute to a theory 
of the social actor without focusing the argument on the concept of actor. Develop-
ing Bourdieu’s concept of habitus further, we understand identity, and thereby the 
social actor, to be a network of dispositions (Schäfer 2015a; 2005). We will address 
this topic more closely in the second part. However, the operators and operations 
that are considered in the first part—mainly internalization, transformation, and 
externalization—theorize the processual logic by means of which social agency is 
constituted.
The first part, “Generative terms,” is structured as follows. The first chapter is 
dedicated to three concepts that are used in the entire theory: struggle, actors, and 
operations (and conceptual derivates)—addressing, beyond Bourdieu, the topic of 
cooperation as well. The following three chapters on internalization, transforma-
tion, and externalization serve as a preparatory exercise for the development of 
the dispositional concept of habitus in the second part of the book. We go into de-
tail about the processes of cognitive transformation of experience into judgments 
and action orientation. Hence, this part is crucial for the theoretical foundation 
of our model of the praxeological square, which we will develop in vol. 3.20 The 
chapter “Externalization” focuses on pragmatic aspects of the habitus, paying 
special attention to the concept of symbol (and its derivates), discourse, and mis-
recognition.
The first part will conclude with a comprehensive chapter about one of the 
most important generative praxeological terms: capital. We will examine the lega-
cies of Marx and Weber, differentiate between specific sorts of capital, and address 
the specificities of symbolic capital as well as the dynamics of conversion between 
different fields of praxis.
The second part of the book, “Mapping praxeology,” attempts to map praxeol-
ogical theory according to our interest in language and other symbolic expressions 
in the context of objectified socio-structural conditions. From a methodological 
perspective, this goal implies an analytical triangulation of qualitative and quan-
titative procedures. From a theoretical perspective, this implies a wide variety of 
praxeological concepts. We have to clarify concepts in a range of variation be-
20 See in Schäfer 2015a, 229 ff.; Schäfer et al. 2015a; 2015b.
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tween those that are directed towards embodied conditions, those that address 
practical interaction, and those that address objectified social conditions. We 
will have to address the theoretical series of “dispositions — habitus — practical 
sense — practical logic — logic of praxis — fields — social space.” Our general inter-
est in the relation between socio-structural inequality and embodied dispositions 
presents us with the task of interpreting the central and most widely used concepts 
of praxeology, spanning the continuum from social space to habitus.
How are the first and the second part of the book related to one another? When 
we map praxeology according to its most emblematic concepts, we outline the 
theoretical environment for the operations of the generative terms. For instance, 
with regard to understanding habitus, in the first part, we opt to describe in detail 
single operations this concept refers to and learn about the operations associated 
with it: embodiment, schemes, the dynamics of perception, judgment, and action 
orientation, dispositions, and so forth. In consequence, we do not understand the 
concept of habitus as a substance, but as a theoretical model that combines several 
practical operations. In the second part, we focus on the concept of habitus from 
a different perspective. We now explain habitus (and other strong Bourdieusian 
concepts) as a term within a wider network or “series” (Cassirer) of theoretical 
concepts, which is defined both by its relations to other terms and by its inter-
nal processes (as discussed in detail in the first part). Additionally, we discuss the 
general theoretical background of the theoretical concepts in sociology and phi-
losophy.
We understand—according to Cassirer and Bourdieu—praxeological concepts 
to be models that allow the observation of social praxis from a certain perspective 
and with an explicit interest (vol. 1, 87 ff.). As instruments of scientific cogni-
tion, the concepts are conceived as forming a series of mutually explicative terms 
that result from previous research. The very fact that some readers would like to 
change the order of such a series or add a concept here and there shows that the 
terms are mutually interpretative. In this sense, the theoretical concepts in their 
specific order, as addressed in this part of the book, propose an environment of 
operation to contextualize the generative terms of praxeology. This environment 
can of course be conceived in a more or less different way, depending on the re-
searcher’s goals.
The detailed approach to the common praxeological concepts through the in-
quiry into generative terms also prevents the misunderstanding of well-known 
concepts as substances whose relations could be reduced to a single function 
between two entities (as exemplified with the phrase “the field determines the 
habitus”). We can rather draw the attention to the usefulness and potential of 
the major praxeological concepts for modeling creativity and variability. With 
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regard to the concept of habitus, its disaggregation does not only facilitate the the-
orization of the creative potential of habitus. It also allows for the development 
of a methodological model for the empirical analysis of habitūs, the praxeologi-
cal square and network (vol. 3). Beyond that, this dispositional understanding of 
habitus allows for the reconceptualization of social actors as both collective and 
individual networks of dispositions and, from there, for the development of a new 
theory of identity and strategy.21
In the second part of the book we will interpret Bourdieu’s theory in a conven-
tional way—at first glance. At second glance, we will show that the inquiry into the 
generative concepts allows for some new accentuations and further developments 
in our mapping of praxeology according to the units of “habitus, practical logic, 
and struggles.” We will proceed as follows.
The first chapter is dedicated to “Creativity in relations: habitus and the prac-
tical sense.” Instead of emphasizing the reproductive features of the concept of 
habitus, we foster a certain tendency in Bourdieu’s work towards a dispositional 
theory of habitus in order to theorize the creative potential of a contextually situ-
ated praxis of human actors. Based upon this interpretation of the habitus, a more 
creative and variable understanding of the practical sense is possible.
The dispositional concept of habitus allows for a corresponding theory of actors 
as networks of dispositions. We will address topics like complexity, intuition, im-
provisation, newness, reflexivity, and the relation between the individual and the 
collective. These considerations generate an understanding of practical sense as 
the embodied (habitus) and objectively visible (practical logic) capability of actors 
to take part in social praxis and thus in social struggles. Besides a sound founda-
tion of the concept of practical sense in phenomenology, this approach brings the 
role of interests and forms of social involvement into the spotlight, and with it 
concepts like illusio, doxa, investments, or stakes.
The following chapter, “Operating in between: practical logic and logic of prax-
 is,” presupposes a major theoretical decision. The concepts of habitus and fields/
social space address embodied and objectified conditions of social praxis, but not 
the operations and processes of praxis. Bourdieu simply analyzes the operations 
and processes in correspondence with his current empirical investigation. He re-
curs to different methods, for instance, of linguistic and ethnological origin, and 
uses them to draw conclusions about the embodied and objectified conditions of 
praxis—habitus, fields, and social space. With our terminological decision to em-
ploy the two concepts of practical logic and logic of praxis, we intend to create a 
21 For a brief outline of this theory of identity see below (2.1.1.3 and 2.2.4.2); see also 
Schäfer 2005; 2015a; 2016a.
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“theoretical space” for the analysis of the dynamics of praxis. From a methodolog-
ical perspective, the “space” between the embodied and the objectified conditions 
of praxis is open to the use of a large variety of sociological methods both for the 
analysis of qualitative and quantitative data (see vol. 3).
From our point of view and research interest, we consider the following topics 
to be particularly relevant. First, we will develop specific concepts of strategy and 
identity as mutually informative processes. Besides tackling the problem of util-
ity maximization, the reformulation of identity as a network of dispositions allows 
for a fresh approach to various topics, such as strategic identities and identitar-
ian strategies. The chapter ends with a long section on “Symbolic power, violence, 
and struggle”—an important issue not only in Bourdieu’s sociology. The concept 
of symbolic violence particularly addresses the consent of the oppressed to be 
oppressed and is thus intimately related to misrecognition. While Bourdieu is in-
terested almost exclusively in the hidden and hard to identify forms of symbolic 
violence, we will expand this discussion by describing visible forms of violence as 
a context for symbolic violence with reference to Johan Galtung. Within the con-
text of power-broking, we will describe the mechanisms of the tacit imposition of 
misrecognition; and beyond Bourdieu, we will also address practices of symbolic 
resistance.
The last chapter of the second part addresses fields and social space as models 
of “specific struggles.” The models of fields and social space are approached from 
the vantage point of the basic generative term “struggle.” In consequence, the mod-
els are not understood as units that depict social entities (in an ontological sense) 
that exist side by side: the political field beside the economic and the cultural, and 
the social space, and so forth. Rather, they are understood as observational in-
struments that structure the struggles in society according to defined research 
interests. The main interest is similar to Marx or Weber: detecting relations of 
domination that underlie the social struggles and thus disclose the dynamics 
that drive these struggles. Thereby, the specific structures of modern societies are 
addressed by the distinction between functional (fields) and stratificatory differ-
entiation (social space).
The major generative term that helps to understand the dynamics of social 
struggle is capital. This social operator contributes particularly good instruments 
for dealing with the relations of power that permeate the entire society. In conse-
quence, there are common features shared by both the models for functional and 
for stratificatory differentiation. Following this insight, we divide this chapter into 
three principal sections: common features between the models of field and space, 
specific dynamics of fields, and particularities of the space model. In addition, we 
will address somewhat critically Bourdieu’s proposal of a “field of power.”
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The section on “common features” of fields and social space starts by spanning 
the theoretical challenges and perspectives of functional and stratificatory models 
in sociology with reference to different scholars. Among other issues, we will dis-
cuss the benefits and limits of geometrical modeling and bivariate approaches to 
social relations as well as the relation between social structures and habitūs. The 
next section addresses fields as the praxeological way of modeling functional dif-
ferentiation in an actor-oriented way and with a particular focus on its relevance 
for our methodological work in vol. 3. After the discussion of theoretical issues, 
we will tackle for the main issues of model construction. In this subsection we 
will prepare for vol. 3, examining possibilities of constructing models based on 
Bourdieu’s sketch of the field of literature (Rules of Art) and those based on multi-
ple correspondence analysis (mainly State Nobility). Another section addresses the 
social space as a model of stratificatory differentiation. After dealing with the rele-
vance of concepts such as social class, capital, culture, habitus, and occupation for 
the construction of the social space, we will again address different ways to model: 
correspondence analysis and a bivariate model. In this chapter we will develop the 
theory and the models of fields and social space as complements to the theory of 
habitus—which is also true the other way around. HabitusAnalysis is based on this 
relation between habitus, fields, and social space—a relation which, from a meth-
odological perspective, requires triangulation.
From a sociological point of view, that brings issues like struggle and inequal-
ity into the focus of attention, power is necessarily a central topic as well. Therefore, 
Bourdieu proceeds from the theories of fields and social space and moves to the 
construction of a field of power. While this model offers some new impulses for 
establishing a sociology of elites, it nevertheless has some flaws. While we sympa-
thize with Bourdieu’s attempt to tackle the problem of a relational theory of social 
power positions, we will not, however, finish this section by suggesting the use of 
a specific model.
The book ends with a twofold outlook: reading the book backwards and for-
wards. The “forward outlook” is of course focused on vol. 3. The “backward out-
look” is slightly unusual, as we have already stated. It is neither a summary nor a 
conclusion. It is written with particular concern for those readers who are more 
interested in fields and social space than in habitus and begin by reading the last 
chapter of the book. They will become aware that the praxeological concepts are 
recursive and will lack the deliberations of earlier and at times rather long chap-
ters. As a special service to these readers, I have selected some topics that emerge 
from theories of fields and social space and refer back to issues discussed in earlier 
chapters more than to other topics. We will address the following topics: dispo-
sitions; the transfer of practical logics between fields; social contexts that are not 
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seen as fields; language as a medium and the analysis of discourse; and finally, 
misrecognition in the tension between objective positions and symbolic violence.
The “forward outlook” provides a brief insight into the projected third volume 
of HabitusAnalysis.
Finally, there are some technical details left to explain. The book begins with 
a reference to the situation in an indigenous Guatemalan town. Just as in volume 
1, we intend to facilitate the approach to the theoretical reflection with vignettes 
that tell everyday stories of people that correspond to the theoretical issues dealt 
with in the respective chapter. These scenes are only partly fictitious. The vignettes 
in the first volume illustrate the situation of the Guatemalan civil war, which was 
raging during our first comprehensive period of field research. The vignettes in 
the present volume reflect the Guatemalan post-war era of the 1990s, when I spent 
short periods in the field. The vignettes in the third volume will refer to a large re-
search project realized between 2012 and 2014.
The book also presents text excerpts from Bourdieu’s works at the start of 
every chapter. The texts are meant to serve as a quick orientation in the vastness 
of Bourdieu’s publications and as a basis for a critical reading of our theoretical 
considerations.
We will of course annex a bibliography. But in the age of full-text searchable 
PDFs, we will forego an index.
